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SELECTED OIL, GAS, AND ENERGY DECISIONS
in considering the PRSA statutory interest in
determining the amount in controversy. The lower
court therefore granted Owner’s motion to remand.

Federal
9th Circuit
Montana Environmental Information Center v. United
States Bureau of Land Management, 615 Fed. Appx.
431 (Mem), 2015 WL 5093001, No. 13-35688 (9th Cir.
2015).

U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia
Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers, 2015 WL 5692095, No. 14–5205 (D.C.
Cir. 2015).

Environmental Information Center (Center) appealed
from a lower court’s grant of summary judgment
against them in suit against United States Department
of Interior’s Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM)
decision to sell oil and gas leases in Montana on the
grounds that the Center did not show a concrete and
redressable injury sufficient to establish standing. On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals emphasized
to establish standing, the Center must show that it: (1)
was under an actual or imminent threat of suffering a
concrete and particularized injury, (2) which is fairly
traceable to the challenged action, and (3) which is
likely to be prevented or redressed by a favorable
judicial decision. The Appellate Court held that the
lower court erred by failing to consider surface harms
caused by development of the challenged leases and
instead focused only on the climate-change effects, and
that recreation and aesthetic interests asserted by the
Center may establish actual injury, thus remanding the
case back to the lower court.

Environmental
Advocacy
Organization
(Organization) brought suit against Federal Agencies
(Agencies) involved in authorizing aspects of a
pipeline project. Organization alleges that the
Agencies failed to conduct a National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) analysis of environmental
impacts related to the construction of the entire
pipeline. Almost all of the land over which the
pipeline is constructed is privately owned, but
approval from the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps)
was required because the pipeline encompassed
nearly 2000 minor water crossings subject to Corp’s
general permitting authority under the Clean Water
Act (CWA). The lower court granted summary
judgment in favor of Agencies. The Court of Appeals
held that the federal government is not required to
conduct NEPA analysis of the entirety of the pipeline
project. Additionally, the Court found that the
Agencies’ regulatory review was limited to discrete
geographical segments of the pipeline comprising
less than five percent of its overall length.

10th Circuit
Whisenant v. Sheridan Production Co., LLC, 2015 WL
5828205, No. 15-6154 (10th Cir. 2015).

United States Court of Federal Claims
Rocky Mountain Helium, LLC v. United States, No.
15-336 C, 2015 WL 5730672 (2015).

Royalty Interest Owner (Owner) filed a class action in
state court alleging that Oil and Gas Company
(Company) failed to pay or underpaid royalties for
natural gas wells in Beaver County, Oklahoma.
Company removed the case to federal court under the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA). The lower
court denied Owner’s motion to remand. CAFA gives
federal courts jurisdiction when the class exceeds 100
members and amount in controversy exceeds $5
million. The lower court found that the alleged unpaid
royalties Company owed amounted to $3,721,797. The
lower court additionally found that pursuant to
Oklahoma’s Production Revenue Standards Act
(PRSA), a 12% per anum interest should be applied to
the unpaid royalties, which amounted to $1,512,869.
Combined, the amount in controversy exceeded the $5
million dollar minimum to remove the case to federal
court. The Tenth Circuit held that the lower court erred

A Helium Extraction Company (Company) and the
United States Department of Interior’s Bureau of
Land Management (BLM) entered into a contract to
conserve and extract the helium produced from oil
and gas wells in western Colorado. Within two years,
Company was in default for non-payment of rent.
However, both the Company and the BLM continued
their working relationship through contract
modifications and settlement agreements until 2009,
when the BLM invoked a Sunset Provision of one of
the agreements and fully and permanently terminated
the contract, resulting in an action by Company filed
in the United States Court of Federal Claims. After
jurisdiction was established, the Court held that since
the first two modifications of the contract between
Company and the BLM were inoperative, the Court
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had to rely on the initial contract and the final
settlement agreement. Upon review of the contract and
settlement agreement, the Court found that because the
Company was in default, the Company had no standing
to bring an action because the conditions precedent to
reinstating the contract were never satisfied. As such,
the BLM could not have breached the contract and the
Company could not state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.

Throughout the parties’ communication, Drilling
Company’s conduct showed that it was willing to
move forward without the protection of the escrow
clause. The Appellate Court also noted that the
subsequent emails did not changed the contract, just
modified the day rate, effective start date, and the
choice of rig.

Barlow & Haun, Inc. v. United States, 2015 WL
5894165, No. 2015-5028 (2015).

In re North Dakota Pipeline Co. LLC, 869 N.W.2d
693 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015).

Oil and Gas Lessees filed suit against the United States,
as Lessor, claiming a Fifth Amendment taking without
just compensation and breach of contract. Lessees’
claims arise from alleged indefinite suspension of oil
and gas operations by United States Department of
Interior’s Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in a
known sodium leasing area (KSLA) and mechanically
mineable trona area (MMTA) in Wyoming. The United
States Court of Federal Claims granted judgment for the
United States, which Lessees appealed. The Appellate
Court held that: (1) the government did not repudiate
the lease, (2) the government did not breach leases by
subsequently imposing conditions that protected worker
safety, (3) regulatory takings claim was not ripe for
review, (4) futility exception to ripeness requirement
did not apply, (5) the BLM did not make decisions with
respect to specific property rights, therefore the claim
was not ripe for adjudication, and (6) other entities were
not in privity with the government.

When a Minnesota Utilities Commission sought to
issue a certificate of need prior to completing an
environmental impact statement, the Minnesota Court
of Appeals found the action violated state
environmental policy. An Organization sought
reconsideration following the Minnesota Public
Utilities Commission’s (MPUC) order to conduct
certificate of need proceedings prior to completion of
environmental impact statements. When MPUC
denied Organization’s petition for reconsideration,
Organization appealed. Approaching the case as a
matter of Minnesota Environmental Policy Act
(MEPA) interpretation, the Appellate Court found
that the plain language of MEPA was unambiguous
in that a final government decision must follow an
environmental impact statement. The Appellate Court
reasoned that completing environmental impact
statements prior to final government decisions would
directly further MEPA interests in accurately
assessing the situation and ensuring that important
environmental effects would not be overlooked. The
Appellate Court, therefore, held that MPUC erred by
not completing an environmental impact statement at
the certificate of need stage. Because MEPA requires
environmental impact statements before a final
government decision, the Appellate Court reversed
the lower court’s decision and remanded the case for
procedural compliance.

Minnesota

State
Louisiana
NorAm Drilling Co. v. E & Pco Intern., LLC, 2015 WL
5714571 (La. App. Ct. 2015).
Operator entered into a daywork contract with Drilling
Company for use of a rig to drill for coalbed methane in
Louisiana. Since Operator did not have adequate
funding, Drilling Company included an escrow clause
in the contract. Until Operator attained funding, they
were to pay Drilling Company day rates to keeps the rig
on standby. Through various email exchanges, the
parties agreed to place a second rig on standby as well
as agreeing that the daywork contract was in full force.
Operator never paid Drilling Company and upon
receiving funding, used a different contractor. Drilling
Company filed suit seeking monetary damages. The
lower court found in favor of the Drilling Company.
Affirming the lower court, the Appellate Court held that
the escrow clause did not form a condition precedent,
and if it did, the party it benefitted could waive it.

Ohio
MAR Oil Co. v. Korpan, 2015 WL 5732059 (N.D.
Ohio 2015).
Oil and Gas Exploration Company (Company)
brought suit against one of its former Landmen and
two of its Competitors. The former Landman of the
Company went to work for two of the Competitors.
The Company alleged that the former Landman
misappropriated confidential and proprietary
information, including seismic data, which the
Landman obtained while working for the Company in
violation of the Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act
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property. The lower court granted Companies’
summary judgment motion. On appeal, the Appellate
Court held that the general rule is that an expert’s
testimony is necessary to establish causation as to
medical conditions outside the common knowledge
and experience of a lay person, but an expert’s failure
to rule out alternative causes on injury renders the
opinion unreliable, and legally constitutes no
evidence. The Appellate Court held that the evidence
did not amount to more than a scintilla of evidence
linking Companies as the proximate cause of the
conditions that substantially interfered with the
Landowner’s use and enjoyment of their property.
Therefore, the lower court did not err in granting a
no-evidence summary judgment in favor of the
Companies.

(OUTSA). Competitors used that information to lease
land and acquire minerals in Northwest Ohio, where
Company’s operations were located. Competitors filed
post-trial motions for reformation of punitive damages.
The District Court denied their motions and held that
the OUTSA punitive damages provision supersedes
Ohio’s general punitive damages statute, and that the
OUTSA permits treble damages. The District Court
held that the Competitors were vicariously liable
because the former Landman disclosed Company’s
proprietary data in the ordinary course of Competitors’
business.
Pennsylvania
Seneca Resources Corp. v. S & T Bank, 2015 WL
5093501, 2015 PA Super 181 (2015).

Kachina Pipeline Co., Inc. v. Lillis, 2015 WL
5889109, No. 13-0596 (Tex. 2015).

Energy Company acquired interest in a lease which
granted the lessee the right to produce, withdraw, store,
or transport oil or gas from the leased premises that
included 10,000 acres of undeveloped land and 15,000
acres of developed land. Trustees, who owned the
mineral interest in the collective acreage, notified
Energy Company that its failure to develop on the
undeveloped acreage constituted a breach of the
implied covenant to produce. The lower court held in
favor of Energy Company, finding that the land covered
under the lease was not severable based on a portion of
it being “undeveloped” and the other portion being
“developed.” In addition, the lower court held that
Energy Company did not violate Pennsylvania’s
doctrine of implied covenant to develop because the
developed portion of the lease was already being
operated before Energy Company acquired their
interest. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania upheld the
lower court’s findings due to the language of the lease,
which indicated that Energy Company had a fee simple
determinable of the entire leasehold, past the primary
term, as long as it produced oil or gas in paying
quantities. The Superior Court also affirmed the lower
court’s finding that Energy Company did not violate an
implied covenant to develop.

Seller of natural gas brought action against Purchaser
for fraud as well as to seek an accounting and
declaration that Purchaser was in breach of their
contract. The lower court granted Purchaser’s noevidence motion for partial summary judgment on the
fraud claim and a motion for traditional partial
summary judgment on the declarations Purchaser
sought. The Appellate Court affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded. Purchaser petitioned
the Supreme Court of Texas for review. The Texas
Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s
decision and held that the contract provision
authorizing deduction of costs to install compression
to effect “delivery” of Seller's gas applied only to
compression required to overcome working pressure
in Purchaser’s system, as well as noting that the
contract did not include option for five-year
extension.

Texas
Cerny v. Marathon Oil Corp., 2015 WL 5852596, No.
04-14-00650-CV (Tex. App. 2015).
Landowner sued an Oil and Gas Corporation and a
Mineral Exploration and Production Company
(Companies) for private nuisance and negligence claims
for toxic emissions from oil and gas operations near
their home, causing damage to their health and
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SELECTED WIND AND WATER DECISIONS
State

Wyoming

Montana

In re The Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in
The Big Horn River System, 2015 WL 5439947
(Wyo. 2015).

Sharbano v. Cole, 355 P.3d 782, 2015 WL 5132038
(Mont. 2015).

Cattle Company held a state permit to water from a
ditch on Landowner’s property. The permit expired
in 1963, however, it was never cancelled, but was
rather routinely extended. A Wyoming regulation
provides that “permits not in good standing could be
reinstated . . . upon proof that lands have been
properly irrigated . . . since date of expiration.” A
field inspection was conducted of Cattle Company’s
207 acres, in which 52 acres showed evidence of
beneficial use by irrigation. The Special Master
recommended a permit for those 52 acres be
reinstated. Landowner filed objections to Special
Master’s report and recommendation. The Supreme
Court of Wyoming found proof of “continuous”
beneficial use prior to 1963 up until the present based
on testimony and aerial photographs, therefore
affirming the Special Master’s report and
recommendation.

Landowner held water rights superior to that of his
Neighbor. Such water arises on the Neighbor’s property
and flows or seeps into a pond on Landowner’s
property. In 2007, 13 years after Neighbor acquired his
water rights, Neighbor began development and
construction, which the Landowner contends reduced or
eliminated the flow of water to Landowner’s property
resulting in an inability for Landowner to utilize his
senior water right. Landowner brought an action
seeking damages and an order for restoration of natural
water flow against Neighbor for interfering with
Landowner’s water right by erection of a pond and
other significant construction activities. The lower court
granted Neighbor’s motion for a verdict in their favor,
and the Neighbor’s motion in limine due to lack of
compliance to a procedural rule. The Supreme Court of
Montana reversed and remanded, stating the
Landowner complied with the procedural rule and
disclosed adequate information regarding the facts of
each claim as well as the grounds for each expert’s
testimony.
Gateway Village, LLC v. Montana Dept. of
Environmental Quality, 2015 WL 5714594 (Mont.
2015).
The District proposed a treatment system that would
discharge up to 500,000 gallons of treated wastewater
each day into an underground zone underneath property
owned by Landowner. The Department of
Environmental Quality (DEQ) approved the District’s
proposal and issued a permit. Landowner alleged that
this proposal would constitute a common law trespass
considering the groundwater extended under their
surface property. The lower court ruled that the use of
the proposed mixing zone would constitute a trespass
invading Landowner’s rights. The lower court required
the DEQ to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS). The Supreme Court of Montana declined to
provide a ruling because the EIS would substantially
change the record, thus making their ruling speculative.
The Supreme Court of Montana also vacated the lower
court’s trespass holding stating the lower court should
have declined to address the trespass claim.
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SELECTED AGRICULTURE DECISIONS
Federal
The court held in abeyance its determination of
whether United States exceeded the scope of the
easement by issuance of the NITU to the parcels held
by Plaintiffs in fee simple.

6th Circuit
Barks v. Silver Bait, LLC, 2015 WL 5751618, No. 15–
5175 (6th Cir. 2015).

Bell v. United States, 2015 WL 5455638, No. 13–
455L (2015).

Former Employees brought this action against an
Employer who operated a “worm farm,” alleging the
Employer violated the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) by failing to pay Employees overtime. The
Appellate Court affirmed the lower court and held that
raising and growing worms for sale as fishing bait
qualifies as “farming” under the FLSA’s agricultural
exemption; thus, the Employer did not have to pay
overtime wages. The Appellate Court determined this
after evaluation of the language of the FLSA, which
does not entail an exhaustive list of possible farming
exemptions, and congressional intent, which includes
“embracing the whole field of agriculture.”

Multiple Landowners brought suit against the United
States International Water and Boundary Commission
(Commission). Landowners owned property along the
Rio Grande River in southern Texas. The Commission
owned easements permitting it to build flood control
structures on the Landowners’ property. The
Commission built a thirteen-foot tall concrete barrier
on the Landowners’ property. The Landowners alleged
that the structure was not a flood control device, but
merely a border fence therefore falling outside the
scope of the easement that the Commission possessed.
The Commission contends that the structures fell
within the scope of the easement and did not constitute
a taking. The Landowners moved for their class to be
certified. The Court of Federal Claims held that
Landowners failed to meet the numerosity and
superiority requirements for class certification, thereby
denying their motion for certification.

United States Court of Federal Claims
Barlow v. United States, 123 Fed. Cl. 186, No. 13396L, 2015 WL 5154931 (2015).
Landowners of property adjacent to railroad line
subject to notice of interim trail use (NITU) brought a
takings action against the United States, pursuant to
the National Trail System Act. Parties cross-moved for
partial summary judgment as to whether takings had
occurred. The disputed lands included: (1) thirteen
parcels conveyed by “right of way,” (2) two parcels
conveyed “for railroad purposes,” (3) three parcels for
which conveying instruments were not present, (4) one
parcel acquired through condemnation, and (5) two
parcels held by Landowners in fee simple. The court
held that, under state law, the word “convey” created a
rebuttable presumption indicating a conveyance of
property in fee simple. Contrary to Landowners’
contention, the phrases “right of way” and “for
railroad purposes” were merely descriptive, not
limiting in nature. The court granted United States’
motion for summary judgment as to these fifteen
parcels. Because Landowners only produced evidence
of ownership of lands abutting those without a
conveying instrument, the court granted summary
judgment to United States as to these three parcels.
The court denied summary judgment to both parties as
to the parcels acquired through condemnation due to
the genuine dispute as to whether the condemnation
occurred before or after the adoption of the 1870
Illinois Constitution, which, after passage, subjected
condemned lands “to the use for which it is taken.”

State
Alaska
DeVilbiss v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough, 356 P.2d
290, No. S-15344 (Alaska 2015).
Following the Borough’s denial of Property Owner’s
request to remove his property from the road service
area, Property Owner filed a complaint against the
Borough, contesting the validity of a road service tax.
Property Owner claims that a property within a road
service area, that does not make use of the roads built
and maintained with the road service taxes levied on
all real property, should be excluded from the service
area and that the tax is invalid absent a special benefit
to his property. The Superior Court rejected Property
Owner’s claims and granted the Borough summary
judgment. The Supreme Court of Alaska held that the
Borough was not required to exclude the Owner’s
property from the road service area and that the road
service tax was not an invalid assessment. The
Supreme Court reinforced the authorization of the
Borough to provide special services within the road
service area, allowing the levying of taxes to finance
such services. Further, the Supreme Court held that
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Appellate Court affirmed the lower court’s conclusion
that a condemnation blight was not a form of de facto
takings and granted summary judgment in favor of the
Water District.

the validity of the tax does not depend on whether the
taxpayer receives a special benefit.
California
People ex rel. Ross v. Raisin Valley Farms LLC, 193
Cal.Rptr.3d 246, 2015 WL 5762842 (Cal. Ct. App.
2015).

Mississippi
Intrepid, Inc. v. Bennett, No. 2014-CA-00999-SCT,
2015 WL 5158397 (Miss. 2015).

The California Raisin Industry sought approval from
California’s Department of Food and Agriculture
(Department) of a marketing and research order
(Order) to remedy its oversupply problems. Pursuant
to the California Marketing Act of 1937 (Act),
regulated growers subject to this Order are required to
pay an assessment for related expenses. Affected
Growers sued the Department for inconsistency with
the Act. The lower court granted judgment for the
Growers based on an interpretation of the CMA,
which has its roots in the Great Depression, requiring
evidence that the Order is “necessary to address
adverse economic conditions” “so severe as to threaten
the continued viability of the industry.” The Appellate
Court reversed, primarily based on a 1945 amendment
to the Act, which distinguishes between orders that
limit production of a commodity and those that do not
limit production, such as the Order at issue. Orders
that do not restrict supply must tend to effectuate the
declared purposes and policies of the Act. The
Appellate Court deferred to the explicit purposes and
policies of the Act thereby enabling producers to
correlate supply with demand, providing means for
maintaining or growing markets, and restoring
purchasing power to producers.

Lessee leased two tracts of farmland from Lessor’s
predecessor in interest. Tract 1, the T.J. Carter Place
(Carter), consisted of 836 acres. Tract 2, the Craigside
Place (Craigside), consisted of 1,975 acres. The lease
covered both tracts for a thirteen-year term and annual
rental rates of $81,500 for Carter and $120,000 for
Craigside, payable in semi-annual installments. The
lease granted renewal options of five years provided
that rental amounts are re-negotiated and may increase
by the amount of increase in the preceding lease term
of rent customary in the area for similar property. At
the end of the initial term, Lessor offered to renew
subject to increased rental rates of $146,300 for Carter
and $286,375 for Craigside. Lessee hesitated and
when Lessor refused Lessee’s offer to have an
arbitrator determine the rent, Lessee tendered the same
rental payments it had in the previous lease term.
Lessor refused such payments and declared the leases
terminated. The Supreme Court of Mississippi
affirmed the Circuit Court’s determination that the
renewal provision was void and unenforceable
because it neither contained the essential element of
price, nor a workable method for determining the
price. The Supreme Court noted that although a court
may supply reasonable terms, such as time for
performance, essential terms such as price cannot be
left as open-ended questions in contracts that
anticipate some future agreement. The Supreme Court
found further support for its decision in that the
geographic area by which the increase should be
measured was completely undefined.

Florida
Teitelbaum v. South Florida Water Management Dist.,
2015 WL 5714852, 40 Fla. L. Weekly D2234 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
Between 1971 and 2002, Landowners continuously
purchased property near Bird Creek Basin, a swampy
area in western Miami, hoping that the land would
eventually be rezoned for commercial or residential
usage. The Water District opposed all rezoning
attempts, claiming that the land must be maintained as
a flood plain. The Water District also attempted to
purchase all the land in the area and passed a
condemnation resolution in 2002 to acquire the
Landowner’s property by eminent domain. In 2008,
the Water District withdrew their proposal to acquire
the land. Despite a lack of interference with the
Landowners’ property, Landowners alleged that the
Water District reduced the value of the land between
2002 and 2008 via their condemnation blight. The

North Carolina
House of Raeford Farms, Inc. v. N.C. Dept. of
Environmental and Natural Resources, 774 S.E.2d
911, No. COA15-47 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015).
Operator of chicken processing facility (Operator)
filed petition for judicial review from the
Environmental Management Commission’s decision
imposing a $50,000 civil penalty against Operator for
permitting waste to be discharged in violation of water
quality standards and allowing settleable solids and
sludge in excess of water quality standards. The
Superior Court of Duplin County reduced the penalty
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National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permitting program. The Plant brought suit
alleging that the Environmental Quality Commission
(Commission) erred in one of the violations when they
found that the Plant was liable for moderate violations
instead of minor violations. The Appellate Court
reviewed the agencies findings of evidence below and
agreed with the Plant that they were only liable for
minor violations. The Appellate Court found the
Commission erred in its ruling because the Plant
submitted substantial evidence throughout the years in
question, and that the Plant’s violation of inaccurate
reporting as required under the NPDES did not have
an adverse impact on the environment or human
health. The Appellate Court noted that the
Commission failed to provide any substantial evidence
to rebut the Plant’s evidence of a de minimis impact on
the environment and, therefore, agreed with the Plant
by finding that their violations were only of a minor
magnitude.

to a single $25,000 fine, to which the North Carolina
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) appealed with Operator cross-appealing.
Operator argued the Superior Court erred by allocating
the burden of proof to Operator rather than DENR as
well as concluding that Operator violated two state
statutes. DENR argued that the Superior Court erred
by reversing the Commission’s decision upholding the
$25,000 penalties, and also failed to defer to the
Commission’s
decision
upholding
DENR’s
assessment of penalties. The Appellate Court made a
number of findings including: (1) the burden of proof
was correctly placed on Operator, (2) the Commission
was required to make specific findings of fact with
regards to statutory factors before assessing a penalty,
(3) Operator was subject to a single fine, and (4) the
Appellate Court was not required to defer to the
Commission’s final decision.
North Dakota
Moody v. Sundley, 2015 ND 204, 868 N.W.2d 491
(N.D. 2015).

Washington
Pendergrast v. Matichuk, 355 P.3d 1210 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2015).

Adjacent Landowners (Landowners) sued their
Neighbor alleging he was trespassing on their
property. The Neighbor counterclaimed for adverse
possession of the disputed property. The parties in
this case disputed the ownership of a portion land
abutting the section-line, located west of a fence on
land owned by the Landowners. The lower court
found in favor of the Landowners and dismissed
Neighbor’s counterclaim on the grounds that his
predecessors-in-interest failed to meet the burden of
proving the elements of adverse possession. The
Neighbor timely appealed claiming that the lower
court erred by failing to conclude that he owned the
disputed property through adverse possession. In
affirming the judgment of lower court, the Supreme
Court of North Dakota held that the Neighbor failed to
establish adverse possession through witness
testimony, or any other evidence, while also failing to
raise the theory of acquiescence of the Landowners in
his pleadings to the lower court. Therefore, the
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower
court and denied any new issue on appeal.

Original landowner (Grantor) deeded two parcels of
their land separated by a fence that ran the length of
the eastern boundary of the Eastern Grantee’s property
and the western length of the Western Grantee’s
property. Four years after the Eastern Grantee
purchased the property from the Grantor, he torn down
the fence and cut down a tree on the east side of the
fence, which was Western Grantee’s property, due to
an erroneous survey which concluded that the fence
and the tree was actually situated entirely on the
Eastern Grantee’s property. The Western Grantee filed
suit to quiet title to the property and for trespass. A
jury found the Eastern Grantee liable for surface
trespass and for timber trespass, awarding the Western
Grantee monetary damages. The Washington Court of
Appeals upheld the jury’s determinations, recognizing
that both parties conduct manifested intent that the
boundary line was the fence. The Court also noted that
the fence provided sufficient notice to each party at the
time of their purchase that it was the proper boundary
separating the two parcels of land.

Oregon
Bandon Pacific, Inc. v. Environmental Quality Com’n,
273 Or. App. 355, 2015 WL 5037113 (Or. Ct. App.
2015).
A seafood processing plant (Plant) was found in
violation of four requirements stipulated under the
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ARTICLES OF INTEREST
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William W. Wade, Ph.d., Liquid Gold or Water for Pecans? Valuation of Groundwater in Regulatory Takings Law,
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